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Abstract
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1Bengali, bengali / Bengali, bengali / No no no / He does not want to depress you/ Oh no
no no no no / He only wants to impress you / Oh.. Bengali in platforms / He only wants
to embrace your culture / And to be your friend forever. [‘Bengali in Platform,’ Morissey,
Viva Hate, 1988, Reprise/Wea]1
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the last decades, immigration into western countries has become an important facet of globalization.
This phenomenon has induced increased concerns regarding the implications of non-economic issues
s u c ha st h er i s eo fe t h n i cd i v e r s i t yi nt h eh o s tc o u n t r i e s . 2 While the diversity of social groups can
be considered as a source of beneﬁts, the persistence of ethnic minority’ identities is, however, often
perceived as a threat or source of frictions by natives (see Alba, 1990, 2005). This is well illustrated,
for instance, by the recent passionate debate around the wearing of the Islamic burqa in France. As
Putnam (2007) put it, in his John Skytte Price Lecture, “the increase in ethnic and social heterogeneity
in virtually all advanced countries is one of the most important challenges facing modern societies,
and at the same time one of our most signiﬁcant opportunities”.
It is therefore of paramount importance to have a precise understanding of the mechanism of iden-
tity formation and its determinants. In fact, two opposing views characterize the theoretical analysis
in the social sciences regarding identity formation.3 A ﬁrst group of social scientists argue that ethnic
identity is reduced by assimilation and by the blurring of groups’ boundaries. Assimilation theories,
in political science and sociology (Gordon, 1964; Moghaddam and Solliday 1991) and contact theory
in social psychology (Allport, 1954) are the prominent manifestations of this line of thought. The
basic premise is the idea that social contacts between natives and ethnic minorities help weaken group
loyalties and group prejudices and hence lead to a more culturally homogeneous society. Through this
process, minority groups adopt inclusive identities and integrate, progressively adopting the language,
values and systems of the dominant group. Underlying this reasoning is the principle that group iden-
tity is driven by a motive for inclusiveness and cultural conformity, positive social interactions across
individuals sharing the same characteristics, views and preferences.4
The alternative view represents ethnic minorities as motivated in keeping their own distinctive
cultural heritage, in identifying themselves with an ethnic/social group to enhance their psychological
self-esteem and generate a sense of positive distinctiveness from individuals who are part of that group
(Abrams and Hogg, 1988; Turner 1982). Various cognitive and psychological mechanisms, from group
solidarity to prejudice and negative stereotypes with respect to other groups, are deemed responsible in
achieving such positive distinctiveness. Negative attitudes towards members of other groups, in turn,
1Thanks to Andrew Clark for Morissey’s quote.
2Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) provide a general discussion of the economic eﬀects of increased ethnic diversity.
3The study of ethnic identity formation has a long theoretical and empirical tradition in social sciences with Cross
(1991), Phinney (1990), Ferdman (1995) in developmental psychology, Stryker (1980) in symbolic interactionist sociology,
Tajfel (1981), Tajfel and Turner (1979), Turner et al. (1987) in social psychology, and Brewer (2001) in political
psychology.
4See Bernheim (1994) for a formal economic analysis of conformity.
2consolidate the social identity of the group. These ideas compose the core of theories of multiculturalism
(Glazer and Moynihan, 1970; Taylor and Lambert, 1996), and conﬂict (Bobo, 1999).5 According to
this view, group identity formation is a sort of cultural distinction mechanism that allows individuals
to reduce the psychological costs associated with cultural diﬀerences. In economic terms, the concept
of cultural distinction can be motivated in terms of negative social interactions across individuals
b e l o n g i n gt od i ﬀerent identiﬁed groups.
To provide a conceptual framework on these issues, we propose a simple model of identity formation
that accounts for both cultural conformity and cultural distinction. We can therefore formally analyze
the implications of each of these opposite views of identity formation and pursue an empirical inves-
tigation guided by the theoretical analysis. We show that cultural conformity and cultural distinction
provide contrasting empirical implications on the way neighborhood segregation and identity forma-
tion interact in the process of ethnic integration. When cultural conformity is the main motivational
process of identity formation, neighborhood segregation and identity formation are likely to be com-
plements for ethnic assimilation. On the contrary, when cultural distinction is at work, neighborhood
segregation and identity formation tend to be substitutes for ethnic assimilation.6 Empirical evidence
for cultural distinction would, for instance, suggest that intense and oppositional identities that give
rise to ethnic conﬂicts might not necessarily be the result of the segregation of the neighborhood in
which ethnic and racial minorities tend to live. In that case, neighborhood mixing policies would not
necessarily favor cultural integration, contrary to presumptions often exposed by social scientists and
commentators.
The diﬀerent implications of cultural conformity and distinction can be tested empirically and
can therefore inform us on the main process of ethnic identity formation. To address more directly
the issue of what motivates identity formation, we study ethnic and religious identity formation as
a social phenomenon at the level of the neighborhood. In particular, we consider the demographic
characteristics of the neighborhood where agents reside, and, more importantly, its ethnic and religious
composition. Furthermore, we link identity formation with homogamous marriages along ethnic and
religious traits. It has indeed been extensively documented that interracial marriage is typically
considered as a sign of inclination toward cultural assimilation (see, in particular, Al-Johar, 2005;
Qian, 1999; Meng and Gregory, 2005; Lichter et al., 2007; Tucker and Mitchell-Kernan, 1990) and
that marriage choices are at least in part determined by parents’ preferences to socialize their children
to their own trait (Bisin, Topa, and Verdier, 2004, and the evidence cited in Bisin and Verdier, 2000).
To be more precise, our analysis exploits a unique UK dataset, the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic
5At a broader level, this view is also related to the social identity theory in social psychology (Tajfel, 1981; Turner,
1982).
6In economics, the distinction between cultural conformity and cultural distinction is also related to the notion of
cultural complementarity and cultural substitutability between socialization mechanisms. This has been deﬁned formally
by Bisin and Verdier (2000). Indeed, in Bisin and Verdier (2000), when family and role models tend to be substitutes in
the process of socialization, families with a relatively minoritarian cultural trait have largeri n c e n t i v e st os p e n dr e s o u r c e s
socializing their children to their trait in order to guarantee its persistence. Conversely, under cultural complementarity,
the more minoritarian is a family’s cultural trait, the lower are the family’s incentives to socialize their children to the
trait and hence to limit cultural assimilation.
3Minorities (FNSEM). This survey, which over-samples ethnic minority groups, asks a direct question
about the respondents’ identiﬁcation with their own ethnic group and provides additional (indirect)
information about diﬀerent dimensions of identity (e.g. attitudes towards inter-marriage, importance
of religion and other aspects of individual’s ethnic preferences). In addition, the survey data can
be merged with the Census, so that it is possible to obtain a detailed picture of each individual’s
residential neighborhood at a very high level of spatial disaggregation.
With the FNSEM data, we estimate our model of the joint determinants of ethnic and religious
identity and homogamy both structurally and non-structurally. The model nests cultural distinction
and cultural conformity as identity formation mechanisms. Our evidence is consistent with ethnic
identity to be formed as a cultural distinction mechanism rather than due to cultural conformity.
Ethnic identity appears to be formed in social contexts in which the minority ethnic trait is mostly
“threatened” either directly by the actions of the majority group (e.g., through explicit acts of rejection
or harassment), or indirectly simply by being exposed to the interaction with the majority norm of
behavior in mixed neighborhoods.
Our evidence for cultural distinction is consistent with several empirical studies studying the link
between identity and segregation. Fryer and Torelli (2010), on data from the National Longitudinal
Study of Adolescent Health, ﬁnd that “acting white” behavior among blacks is more developed in
racially mixed schools.7 Also, Bisin, Topa, and Verdier (2004) document that, in General Social
Survey data, religious socialization across U.S. states is more intense when a religious faith is in
minority.8 Finally, Munshi and Wilson (2008) combine data from the U.S. census and the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth to identify a negative relationship across counties in the Midwest of
the United States between ethnic fractionalization in 1860 and the probability that individuals have
professional jobs or migrated out of the county by 2000.
We also address the issue of the alleged speciﬁcity of Muslim immigrants with regard to the strength
of their identity and their (refusal of) integration; an issue which has recently surged at the center
of the political debate in Europe (see, e.g., Gallis, 2005). To this end we repeat our analysis on the
restricted sample of Muslim respondents only. The results are not qualitatively diﬀerent from the ones
found using the whole sample. This evidence suggests that the relationship between ethnic integration
eﬀort and ethnic neighborhood composition is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for Muslims than for the other
ethnic minorities. Evidence of slower integration for Muslims, both ﬁrst and second generation, is,
however, apparent in our analysis.
Beyond the large sociology and socio-psychology literature on ethnic identity formation, our work
is related to a growing economic literature studying the evolution of culture and ethnic identity and
its interactions with economic outcomes. Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2010) consider identity forma-
7Anthropologists have also observed that social groups seek to preserve their identity, an activity that accelerates
when threats to internal cohesion intensify. Thus, groups may try to reinforce their identity by penalizing members for
diﬀerentiating themselves from the group. The penalties are likely to increase whenever the threats to group cohesion
intensify; for an early analysis of this issues, see Whyte (1943).
8Relatedly, Bisin and Verdier (2000) provide many examples of the resilience of ethnic and other cultural traits that
can be explained by a similar mechanism, from the case of Orthodox Jews in Brooklyn to the case of aristocrats in
France.
4tion as an explicit − more or less conscious − endogenous choice by individuals exposed to a certain
social context. Darity, Mason, and Stewart (2006) and Eaton, Eswaran and Oxoby (2009) provide
evolutionary models discussing the relationship between identity formation and inter-racial interac-
tions. In the speciﬁc context of African American communities of the Ante-Bellum American South,
Bodenhorn and Ruebeck (2003) also underline the endogeneity of racial identity. Chiswick (2009) em-
phasizes the role of ethnic speciﬁc human capital in minority groups’ decisions to culturally assimilate
or separate. Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005), Battu, Mwale and Zenou (2007), Bisin, et al. (2008b)
and Fang and Loury (2005) discuss the emergence persistence of “oppositional” or “dysfunctional”
identities in marginalized social groups. In the context of migrant communities in Germany, Constant
and Zimmermann (2008) and Constant, Gataullina, and Zimmermann (2009) analyze ethnic identity
as the endogenous balance between commitment to and self-identiﬁcation with the culture and society
of the origin and the host country. Battu and Zenou (2010), Nekby and Rödin (2010), and Manning
and Roy (2010) ﬁnd that language proﬁciency in the host country, isolation and segregation, years
spent in the host country, intermarriage, and education acquired before immigration are signiﬁcantly
correlated with ethnic identity.
Like us, this emerging literature recognizes the endogeneity and contextual character of ethnic and
cultural identity formation. Our contribution is, however, to try and open the “black box” of identity
formation, to disentangle and identify in a speciﬁc empirical context the precise mechanisms of identity
formation (i.e., cultural distinction versus cultural conformity), which have distinct implications for
cultural integration processes across social groups.
Before proceeding, we should brieﬂy alert the reader of the methodological choice of the present
paper. We proceed in steps, from a non-structural analysis of the data to a fully structured model
estimation. By doing so, we make apparent that o u rr e s u l t sa r eo n l yi np a r td e t e r m i n e db yt h e
structural (functional-form) identiﬁcation obtained by putting directly to data the theoretical model.
On the contrary, our structural results are suggested by more ﬂexible statistical approaches to the
data. More precisely, we start in Section 2 with a non structural probit analysis of identity and
homogamy in terms of ethnic composition. Section 3 then proposes a semi-structural analysis of
homogamy and identity. While disregarding some cross-equation restrictions as imposed in a fully
structural approach, thus approach has the ability to address the issue of cultural distinction versus
cultural conformity. Section 4 goes further by providing and estimating a fully structural model of
ethnic integration. Section 5 focuses on Muslims only. Finally, Section 6 concludes and discusses some
policy implications.
2 Descriptive analysis of the data
The Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities (FNSEM) was collected in 1993/94 in the U.K. by the
Policy Studies Institute (PSI). It over-samples ethnic minority groups, distinguishing explicitly six of
them: Caribbean, Indian, Pakistani, African-Asian, Bangladeshi, and Chinese.9 The survey contains
9Black Africans were not included because the bulk of their immigration in the U.K. happened earlier. Furthermore,
the survey only covers England and Wales.
5detailed information about the respondents’ identiﬁcation with their own ethnic group (e.g. attitudes
towards inter-marriage, importance of religion and other aspects of individual’s ethnic preferences)
as well as variables aiming at capturing the heterogeneity within the non-white population in terms
of individual, demographic, family and socio-economic characteristics (see Modood et al., 1997, for
details).
We enrich the analysis of ethnic identiﬁcation, necessarily a self-reported “subjective” measure,
with the study of marriage homogamy along ethnic lines. Homogamy can in fact be considered an
“objective” measure of identity, which is conceptually strongly related to our subjective measure.
Finally, to address the main issue of this paper, the identiﬁcation of cultural distinction versus
cultural conformity, we need to study the variation of the respondents’ identiﬁcation with their own
ethnic group across diﬀerent residential neighborhoods as characterized by their ethnic composition.
To this end, we merge the FNSEM data with the 1991 Census in order to get valuable information of
each individual’s residential ward.10
2.1 Deﬁnition of the variables
The key variables in our analysis are (i) the ethnic composition of the residential neighborhood, q;
(ii) the intensity of ethnic identity, ν;a n d(iii), the probability of homogamous marriage, π.T h e ya r e
described in turn.
(i) The ethnic composition of the neighborhood is observed at the level of the residential ward
from the 1991 Census data. For each individual i, we consider the percentage of ward inhabitants of
the same ethnic group. It has been divided in seven classes, qi ≤ 2%, 2% <q i ≤ 5%, 5% <q i ≤ 10%,
10% <q i ≤ 15%, 15% <q i ≤ 25%, 25% <q i ≤ 33%,q i ≥ 33%. As usual, the mean value of each
interval is used in the regression analysis. Figure 1 reports the distribution of respondents over the
ethnic composition of the neighborhood in which they live. It should be clear that variation in q does
not proxy for ethnic group; that is, it is not the case that, for example, the respondents of distinct
ethnic groups predominantly live in neighborhoods with speciﬁc ethnic composition.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
(ii) The survey contains a number of questions providing information on diﬀerent dimensions
of identity, in particular, the importance of religion, the attitudes towards inter-marriage, and the
relevance of ethnicity in inﬂuencing the kind of school people want for their children.11 It also asks a
direct question about ethnic identity.12 We perform our analysis using separately the answers on each
10A UK Census ward contains on average 3,000-4,000 residents.
11The precise questions are the following ones: “How important is religion to the way you live your life? Is it not at
all important, not very important, fairly important or very important?”; “Would you personally mind if a close relative
were to marry a white person?; “If you were choosing a school for an eleven-year old child of yours, would your choice
be inﬂuenced by how many (respondenr’s ethnic group origin) children there were in the school? And, if "yes", would it
be a very important inﬂuence, a fairly important inﬂuence or a not very important inﬂuence?” .
12Speciﬁcally, in the FNSEM, the people interviewed are asked if they strongly agree, agree, neither agree or disagree,
disagree, strongly disagree, with the statement: “In many ways, I think of myself as [respondent’s ethnic group]”.
6of these questions. Identity, denoted by I, is coded as a dichotomous variable taking value 1 if the
individual considers as very important the role of religion in her/his life, and 0 otherwise (importance
of religion). It takes value 1 if the individual would personally mind if a close relative were to marry
a white person, and 0 otherwise (inter-ethnic marriage). It takes value 1 if ethnicity has a very
important or at least fairly important inﬂuence in choosing the school for a child and 0 otherwise
(school ethnic composition). Finally, it takes value 1 if the individual strongly agrees or agrees to the
statement “In many ways, I think of myself as [respondent’s ethnic group]”, and 0 otherwise (ethnic
group identiﬁcation). The variable measuring the intensity of ethnic identity, ν, is then the probability
that I =1 , for each aspect of these diﬀerent measures of identity.
(iii) Homogamy H is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the respondent is married to a person of
her/his own ethnic group, and 0 otherwise. The variable π measures the probability that marriage is
homogamous. Singles, somewhat consistently with the theoretical analysis of integration in Section 4,
are assigned H =0 , that is, they are treated as non-homogamous.
An extensive set of control variables is also available. In addition to several individuals’ observable
characteristics (i.e., education, age, sex, fertility choices, employment status, job qualiﬁcation, house-
hold house ownership, macro-region of residence, time spent in the UK, a dummy indicating whether
the respondent is born in the UK or not), the data set also contains control variables aiming at cap-
turing the inﬂuence of the social environment (family, friends, neighbors) and workplace (language
t y p i c a l l ys p o k e ni nt h ef a m i l y ,w i t hf r i e n d s ,a tw o r k, a dummy capturing instances of discrimination,
and one indicating whether the marriage is arranged by the parents, the ward unemployment rate).
Precise deﬁnitions of all these variables, as well as our sample descriptive statistics, can be found in
the Data Appendix (Table A1). Excluding the individuals with missing or inadequate information on
our target variables, we obtain a ﬁnal sample of 1,559 individuals.
2.2 Identity and homogamy: A probit
Empirically identifying cultural distinction from cultural transmission would require observing a neg-
ative relationship between ethnic identity (resp. homogamy) and the ethnic composition of the neigh-
borhood as measured by q. A negative sign would indicate cultural distinction while a positive sign
would mean cultural conformity. Naturally, a regression analysis is diﬃcult to interpret because of the
endogeneity of q: the ethnic composition of the neighborhood might, in principle, be an important
factor aﬀecting the respondents’ residential decisions. In the course of this paper, we shall deal with
this endogeneity problem, both directly and indirectly, by imposing more structure on the empirical
analysis. It is nonetheless interesting to present the results of a simple probit regression, looking at
the correlation between ethnic identity (measured either directly by I or indirectly by homogamy H)
and ethnic composition (measured by q), allowing for a non-linear relationship. We perform such
a bivariate probit analysis with diﬀerent (increasing) sets of control variables and using alternative
deﬁnitions of ethnic identity. Table 1 shows the complete list of estimation results when “importance
of religion” is used as a proxy for ethnic identity, whereas Table 2 displays the same results when
the three other measures of ethnic identity (ethnic group identiﬁcation, school ethnic composition,
7inter-ethnic marriage)a r eu s e d . 13
[Insert Tables 1a n d2here]
We ﬁnd that there is a positive and signiﬁcant relationship between ethnic identity and ethnic
neighborhood composition q.W e a l s o ﬁnd signiﬁcant non-linearities, i.e., the quadratic term in q is
negative and signiﬁcant. In particular, both identity and homogamy appear to be negatively related to
ethnic composition for values of q greater than 20%.T h i ss u g g e s t sacultural distinction mechanism.
Figure 2a conﬁrms this result by depicting the estimated (non-linear) eﬀect of q on identity and
homogamy when the inﬂuence of our most extensive set of controls has been purged out.14 The non-
linearities picked up by the probit models might, in principle, be due to the diﬀerential distribution
of ethnic groups by neighborhood class.15 This is not the case, in fact, since the same form of non-
linear dependence in q is obtained when the sample is restricted to Muslims only (mostly Pakistanis,
Bangladeshis, and Indians), as documented in Figure 2b.16 These non-linearities suggest that ethnic
identity is weak in relatively homogenous neighborhoods and strong in mixed neighborhoods.
[Insert Figure 2a and 2b here]
The analysis in this section is essentially descriptive and more structure is necessary to be more
conﬁdent in interpreting the results of Figures 2a and 2b as evidence for cultural distinction. We start
introducing some more structure in the next section.
3 Conformity versus distinction: Some structure
Consider a member of an ethnic or religious group.17 As in the previous section, let q denote the
proportion of ethnic minorities in the neighborhood where this ethnic person resides. Let homogamy
be an index H ∈ {0,1},w i t hPr{H =1 } = π (i.e. H =1means that the ethnic minority is
married to someone from the same ethnic group while H =0indicates heterogamy). There is a
psychological cost of interacting with individuals from the majority (dominant) group. We assume
13In the probit estimations, we measure q as the fraction of own ethnic group in the neighborhood. The fraction of all
minority residents in the neighborhood has been, however, included among the controls.
14This graph is depicted using “importance of religion” as a proxy for ethnic identity. The use of the other proxies
leads to similar pictures.
15We thank Bill Easterly for raising this point in a critical discussion of the paper.
16W eh a v ea l s op e r f o r m e do u ra n a l y s i su s i n gaam u l t i d i m e n s i o n a lm e a s u r eo fe t h n i ci d e n t i t y ,w h i c hs u m m a r i z e st h e
information contained in the available indicators. We have followed the standard approach in the sociological literature
to derive quantitative information on sensitive topics using qualitative answers to a battery of related questions. This
is a standard factor analysis, where the factor loadings of the diﬀerent variables (questions) are used to derive the total
score (multidimensional measure). The Crombach-α measure is then used to assess the quality of the derived index. In
our case, we obtain an α equal to 0.86 (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) indicating that the diﬀerent items incorporated in the index have
considerable internal consistency. We ﬁnd that even this aggregate measure do not depend (qualitatively) diﬀerently on
q.
17We only consider here two groups: the ethnic minority and the majority groups. Our theoretical analysis can easily
be extended to more than one ethnic group.
8that this (psychological) cost depends on the marriage status of the minority member and is denoted
by C(H). We further assume that such costs are lower in an homogamous than in an heterogamous
marriage, i.e.
∆C = C(0) − C(1) > 0 (1)
Indeed, all ethnic minorities need to interact with natives, for example when their kids go to the
same school and have the same social activities, or when they need to ﬁnd a job. The unit cost of
interacting with natives is the same for all ethnic minorities. However, we postulate that, when a
minority individual gets married with someone from the same ethnic group, he/she does not need to
socially interact as much with natives (he/she puts children in an “ethnic” school, works with people
from the same ethnic group, etc.). As a result, the total cost of socially interacting with natives is
lower for an individual in an homogamous marriage than for someone who is married to a native
(heterogamy) since the latter spends more time with natives (he/she needs to meet the parents in
law, to put his/her kids in the majority school, etc.). In our framework, C denotes the total cost of
interacting with a native and it satisﬁes (1), that is C(0) >C (1).
In general, ∆C is also a function of q as well as of the strength of identity of the ethnic minority; we
denote this strength of identity by an index I ∈ {0,1} with Pr{I =1 } = ν.18 Indeed, the composition
of the neighborhood as well as the strength of identity have an obvious impact on this cost diﬀerential
since families living in more “ethnic” neighborhoods and with stronger ethnic identities are more
ensured that their ethnic identity will be passed on to their kids. We thus have ∆C = ∆C(q,I).19 It
is then straightforward to formulate a precise deﬁnition of cultural conformity and distinction:
The preferences of an ethnic minority individual display
cultural conformity if the diﬀerential cost ∆C decreases with the proportion of non-minority mem-
bers 1 − q,i . e .
∂∆C(q,I)
∂q > 0;
cultural distinction if the diﬀerential cost ∆C increases with the proportion of non-minority mem-
bers 1 − q,i . e .
∂∆C(q,I)
∂q < 0.
In the cultural conformity assumption, the minority’s psychological costs of interacting with indi-
viduals from the majority group are decreasing in the proportion of whites living in the neighborhood
where the minority resides. In the cultural distinction assumption, we have the opposite.20 To be
more precise, when minorities are more exposed to the majority group (i.e., when 1 − q increases),
the diﬀerence in interaction costs with whites between an homogamous and heterogamous minority
person is reduced with cultural conformity. Indeed, in that case, minorities tend to assimilate to the
majority norm and their marital status have less impact on interaction costs. However, when we con-
sider cultural distinction, this cost diﬀerential tends to increase because minorities are now rejecting
the “white” norm and homogamous minorities interact much less with the majority group.
18C is therefore also a function of both q and I.
19Remember that in this section both q and I are exogenous. We will relax these assumptions below.
20See our discussion in the Introduction.
9Minority members put eﬀort in ﬁnding a spouse of the same ethnic background. Let this eﬀo r tb ea
continuous variable denoted by τ ∈ [0,1].T h em i n o r i t ym e m b e rﬁrst searches a spouse in a restricted
pool of partners from his/her own community minority. The search intensity, τ, determines the
probability with which he/she ﬁnds his/her marital partner in the pool. With the residual probability
1−τ, he/she remains unsuccessful and therefore goes to a common pool of partners that includes both
minority and majority types. There, he/she gets matched with a spouse of his/her community with
probability q. As a result, an ethnic minority individual living in a neighborhood with a fraction q of
minority members has a probability of marrying homogamously equals to
π(τ,q)=τ +( 1− τ)q (2)
The search intensity τ is chosen by the agent but it requires a cost Z(τ), which is increasing and





where α is a measure of the relative cost of τ.









In other words, each minority individual chooses the homogamy eﬀort τ that minimizes the expected














The probability of an homogamous marriage is thus equal to
π∗ = q +
1
α
(1 − q)2∆C(q,I) (5)
Observe that if there is cultural distinction, then ∂τ∗/∂q < 0, i.e., the higher is the proportion of the
same ethnic group living in the neighborhood, the lower is the homogamy eﬀort while the opposite
sign is true (∂τ∗/∂q > 0) with cultural conformity if the elasticity of q with respect to ∆C is large
enough. However, the sign of ∂π∗/∂q tends to be ambiguous with either cultural distinction or cultural
conformity. This is what we want to investigate empirically now.
21For notational simplicity, we don’t put q and I as arguments of the cost function C(.) .
103.1 Empirical implementation
Based on this simple model, we would like to test equation (5), i.e. the relationship between π
(homogamy) and q (neighborhood ethnic composition). To be able to empirically implement the
model, we introduce x, a vector of exogenous variables (like e.g. age, education, etc.) which aﬀects
both q (neighborhood composition) and ν (identity strength), and the cost Z(τ).T h e r e l a t i o n s h i p










ατ2 +( γτ x)τ
where γτ x =
PK
j=1 γτjxj. Rewriting the ﬁrst-order condition (5) with this extension in terms of x
leads to:
π∗ = q +
1
α
(1 − q)2∆C(q,I) −
1
α
(1 − q)(γτ x) (6)
The empirical implementation of this equation requires therefore ﬁtting
∆C :[ 0 ,1] ×{ 0,1} → R and F : RK → [0,1]2
with appropriate approximating polynomials.
Two important caveats are, however, in order. First of all, the function F(x) is an equilibrium
mapping. It will depend on deep parameters that determine ∆C(q,I).23 In other words, the model








F(x). By approximating ∆C(q,I) via polynomials, we are implicitly disregarding these restrictions.
At this stage, however, the objective of our empirical work is not to estimate the deep parameters of
the model but rather just to test cultural conformity (i.e.
∂∆C(q,I)




Second, the identity formation process of the members of a minority group depends on the cultural
characteristics of the minority itself (e.g., his/her cultural distance to the majority), but also on the
actions and predispositions of the majority (e.g., their racial attitudes). We do not have accurate data
to be able to distinguish between these determinants of identity, even though x contains some controls
of some relevance, e.g., a measure of the episodes of ethnic/religious harassment each respondent has
been subject to.
22That is, under conditions suﬃcient to guarantee a unique choice of (q,ν) for any x. In fact, we do not need to assume
this. We can deal with the general case, in which equilibria are multiple and the equilibrium conditions are written as
G(π,q,ν;x)=0 , along the lines of Bisin, Moro, and Topa (2009).
23It might be convenient in general to restrict the map F so that F(x)=f(Xq,X ν), for f : R
2 → [0,1]
2 and +
Xq = γq x
Xν = γν x
.
11Let us now describe more precisely our empirical strategy here. Let the deep parameters of the
model be denoted by θ, a vector. Let θ be decomposed so that θ =[ θ1,θ2,θ3]. Without loss of






= F(x) only depends on parameters [θ2,θ3].
As stated above, the objective of our empirical work here is not to estimate the deep parameters of
the model, θ but rather to test if the sign of
∂∆C(q,ν)
∂q is negative (i.e. cultural distinction) or positive
(i.e. cultural conformity). In that case, it is suﬃcient to estimate (6), approximating ∆C(q,ν) as
follows via a second order polynomial:
∆C(q,ν) ≈ β1 + β2q + β3q2 + β4ν + β5ν2 + β6qν + β7q2ν + β8qν2 + β9q2ν2
3.2 Results
Results of the empirical analysis are reported in Figures 3a and 3b (for the whole sample and the
Muslim sample only, respectively). For both samples, the partial derivative of the interaction costs
with respect to q is always negative,
∂∆C(q,I)
∂q
< 0, for both I =0and I =1 .
This result is clearly evidence in favor of the cultural distinction mechanism: integration, as manifested
by a relatively high q, leads to signiﬁcant diﬀerence in interaction costs between homogamous and
heterogamous individuals.
[Insert Figures 3a and 3bh e r e ]
4 Ethnic integration: Structural models
We now complement the analysis of the previous section by structurally studying ethnic integration
via marriage, location, and identity formation. Formally, this requires developing a model for ∆C(q,I)
so that q and I are chosen and are not exogenously given (as in the previous section). In fact, we will
study two distinct models, one in which location is exogenous and one in which identity is exogenous.
To be more precise, we develop two diﬀerent, extreme (semi-nested) models:
Marriage and identity (with exogenous ethnic composition of the location, q): people are dropped
in a neighborhood and then form their ethnic identity (choose ν) and look for a spouse (choose
τ).
Marriage and location (with exogenous identity I) :p e o p l ea r eb o r nw i t ha ni d e n t i t ya n dt h e n
look for a neighborhood where to reside (choose q) and a spouse (choose τ).
124.1 Marriage and identity
As in Section 3.1, we deﬁne the psychological cost of interacting with individuals from the majority
group by C(H,I,q). In other words, this cost for an ethnic minority depends on his/her marriage
status H (=1if homogamous and 0 otherwise), his/her identity status I (=1if having a strong
identity and 0 otherwise) and q, the percentage ethnic minorities where he/she resides. We have
(H,I) ∈ {0,1}2 and q ∈ [0,1]. Observe that the probability ν =P r {I =1 } is here modeled as
a choice of the individual. In terms of notation, we use ν ∈ [0,1] rather than I. W ea s s u m et h a t
identity and homogamy act as complements to each other so that either ν =P r {I =1 } and H =1or
1−ν =P r {I =0 } and H =0 . In other words, individuals with strong identity are necessary married
to someone from the same ethnic group (H =1 ) while people with weak identity are necessary married
to whites (H =0 ). For simplicity, we use the following explicit function:
C(H,ν,q)=( 1− νH)C(q)
which implies that either C(1,ν,q)=( 1− ν)C(q) or C(0,ν,q)=C(q). This means that a strong
identity (ν) with an homogamous marriage (H =1 ) leads to a lower cost of interacting with whites
than a weak identity with an heterogamous marriage. Our explanation is as before. Individuals
married to someone from the same ethnic group and having a strong identity do not interact very
much with whites and thus have a lower interacting cost than someone more “integrated” to the
majority group. This speciﬁcation implies that
∆C(q,ν)=νC(q) (7)
In this section, we assume that location q is exogenous and individuals choose their identity and
homogamy eﬀorts, ν and τ. The utility cost of developing identity ν is denoted by J(ν) and is





As a result, a minority member’s problem is:
max
ν,τ {−π(τ,q)(1 − ν)C(q) − [1 − π(τ,q)]C(q) − Z(τ) − J(ν)}













The ﬁrst order conditions of this problem are given by:
ν∗ =
αqC(q)




α − (1 − q)
2 C2(q)
13where α is assumed to be large enough for ν∗ > 0 and τ∗ > 0.T h e s eﬁrst order conditions can easily
be reduced to:
ν = πC(q) (9)




This is a simultaneous equation system in which (ν,π) are the endogenous variables and q the exoge-
nous variable. We can explicitly calculating π∗ by using (9). We obtain:
π∗ =
αq
α − C2(q)(1 − q)2 (11)
4.2 Marriage and location
In this section, we still assume (7). The choice of identity ν is now exogenous while location q is
chosen. The cost of living in a neighborhood with a percentage q of ethnic minorities is denoted by






The minority member’s problem can now be written as:
max
q,τ {−π(τ,q)(1 − ν)C(q) − [1 − π(τ,q)]C(q) − Z(τ) − G(q)}












The ﬁrst order conditions of this problem are given by:
−ν(1 − τ)C(q)+C0(q)(1− νπ)+q =0
−ν(1 − q)C(q)+ατ =0




+ C0(q)(1− νπ)+q =0
−νC(q)+α
(π − q)
(1 − q)2 =0
This is a simultaneous equation system in which (q,π) are the endogenous variables and ν the exoge-
nous variable. The solution is rather involved. For our empirical application, it is convenient to write
24We assume that, other things equal, neighborhoods with higher q are less preferable (because, for example, of higher
unemployment, less average income, etc.). We do not need to make this assumption. We could estimate the sign of the
dependence of costs from q. But all agents would live in segregated neighborhoods under the assumptions of our model
if they were cheaper to reside in.



















C(q)(1+q) − q(1 − q)C0(q)
¤





The system has two solutions, in principle.
4.3 Conformity versus distinction: A full structural analysis
In the cultural conformity model, the minority’s psychological costs of interacting with individuals
from the majority group are decreasing in the proportion 1−q of whites residing in the neighborhood
where the minority lives. The simplest formulation therefore has:
C(q)=cq (15)
In the cultural distinction model the minority’s psychological costs to interact with individuals
from the majority group are increasing in the proportion 1 − q of whites living in the neighborhood
where the minority resides. The simplest formulation thus has:
C(q)=c(1 − q) (16)
Given (7), this implies that ∆C(q,ν)=νcqand thus ∂∆C(q,ν)/∂ > 0 for the cultural conformity
model, and ∆C(q,ν)=νc(1 − q) and thus ∂∆C(q,ν)/∂ < 0 for the cultural distinction model. This
is exactly the deﬁnitions we gave in Section 3.
W ec a nt h e np l u gt h ev a l u eo fC(q), given by either (15) or (16), into the marriage and identity
model (Section 4.1) and the marriage and location model (Section 4.2). It is therefore crucial to
distinguish between the cultural substitution and cultural distinction models. Formally, we can nest
the reduced form equations by writing:
C(q)=cψ(q), with ψ(q)=γ1 − γ2q
so that
when γ1 = γ2 =1 there is cultural distinction
when γ1 =0and γ2 = −1 there is cultural conformity
(17)
Empirically, to discriminate between the two models, it is suﬃcient to verify whether γ2 is greater or
smaller than zero.
154.4 Empirical implementation
Both the marriage and identity, and the marriage and location models are identiﬁed exploiting the
non-linearities induced by the choice problems and the functional form assumptions we impose. As
in Section 3.1, for the empirical implementation of costs, we have to add the vector of individuals’

















where xj (j = τ,ν,q) are the exogenous determinants of the cost and regressors in the empirical
implementation, and γτ xτ, γν xν, γq xq represent the vector notation: γτ xτ =
PN
j=1 γτjxj, γν xν =
PN
j=1 γνjxj,a n dγq xq =
PN
j=1 γqjxj.
By using these cost formulations and solving each program, we can extend equations (9) and (10)
and obtain a simultaneous equation system in ν and π for the marriage and identity model. Likewise,
for the marriage and location model, we extend equations (13) and (14) and obtain a simultaneous
equation system in q and π. The Appendix provides the details on the systems of equations we put
to data (equations (26)-(27) and equations (28)-(29)) as well as simple informal argument for the
identiﬁcation of parameters γ1,γ2,c,α,γν,γτ.
Writing a likelihood function and searching for the structural parameters (γ1,γ2,c,α,γν,γτ)i s
straightforward.25 Because there are no a priori arguments to select the variables to be included as
determinants of the costs of identity and homogamy, we consider xν = xτ = x.
We observe n (independent) bivariate Bernoulli trials with a pair of characteristics being studied
at each trial. The probabilities of the outcomes vary over the trials. We have:
Pr{Ii = yi} =
(
νi yi =1
1 − νi yi =0
and Pr{Hi = zi} =
(
πi zi =1
1 − πi zi =0
Once the joint determination of I and H is explicitly accounted for by the forms of the probabilities
ν and π, the two random variables may be assumed to be independent. Hence
Pr{Ii = yi,H i = zi} = ν
yi
i (1 − νi)
1−yi π
zi
i (1 − πi)
1−zi






i × (1 − νi)
1−yi × π
zi
i × (1 − πi)
1−zi (18)
The maximization of the likelihood function (18) under the two (alternative) models (17) will then
uncover which one of the two models of integration formation better ﬁts our data.26
25Otherwise one can proceed via GMM as in Bisin, Topa and Verdier (2004).
26The estimation has been performed using R programming language (www.r-project.org).
164.5 Results
The maximum likelihood estimation results of the endogenous identity (i.e. marriage and identity)
and the endogenous location (i.e. marriage and location) are reported in the ﬁrst two columns of Table
3, using the most extensive set of controls.27 The last two columns report the results of our analysis
when restricting the attention to Muslims only, which we will discuss in Section 5. Following Burnham
and Anderson (2002), we adopt the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) as a test between non-nested
models for model selection. Diﬀerent competing models can be ranked according to their AIC, with
the one having the lowest AIC being the best. In the general case, AIC =2 k −2ln(L) where k is the
number of parameters in the statistical model, and L is the value of the maximized likelihood function.
In our simple context (in which k does not vary between models), the AIC reduces to a likelihood
comparison: the preferred model is the one with the highest maximized likelihood (i.e. lowest AIC).
The maximized likelihoods are reported in the last row of Table 3. The evidence overwhelmingly favors
the endogenous identity model over the endogenous location model. Indeed, the endogenous identity
model shows a maximized likelihood value that is much higher than the one of the endogenous location
model (-1288.972 and -1369.067 respectively). It is thus apparent that the endogenous identity model
(with exogenous location) performs best.28
[Insert Table 3 here]
Let us now focus our attention on the parameter estimates. As noted before, the eﬀects of the
exogenous regressors are not additively separable from the eﬀect of q.Our test of the cultural distinction
against the cultural conformity mechanism is based on the estimate of γ2. As stated in (17), a positive
estimate of γ2 would be in line with the cultural distinction model whereas a negative estimate would
support the cultural conformity model. Table 3 shows that such an estimate is clearly positive, which
indicates that a cultural distinction mechanism of identity formation is consistent with our data.29
To develop a better intuition about which aspect of the data drives this result, we study the en-
dogenous identity model (i.e. the better performing model) in more detail. Under cultural distinction,
the ﬁrst order conditions of the model are given by:30
ν = πc (1 − q) (19)




Various simple conclusions can be obtained from these equations. Consider ﬁrst condition (19),
expressing how identity formation ν depends on the proportion q of minority members and on π
27The estimation has also been performed under diﬀerent (increasing) sets of controls (as in Table 1). The results on
our target parameters remain qualitatively unchanged.
28For only one of the two solutions of the endogenous location model the estimation converges.
29A more rigorous statistical comparison which would imply to compare the unconstrained with the constrained
likelihood under the two sets of constraints γ2 > 0 and γ2 < 0 is problematic in these cases because the distribution
of the resulting likelihood ratio tests with inequality constraints are non-standard (see Chernoﬀ, 1954; Wilks, 1938; Self
and Liang, 1987; Shaw and Geyer, 1997).
30We replace C(q)=c(1 − q) in (9) and (10).
17the probability of homogamy. Clearly, the larger is the proportion of minority members and the more
segregated the neighborhood is, the lower is C(q)=c(1 − q), the psychological cost of interacting with
the majority group, and the smaller are the incentives for identity formation as a cultural distinction.
On the other hand, the higher is the probability π of homogamous marriage resulting from socialization
eﬀort, the larger are the expected beneﬁts from identity formation and the more intense is the identity.
Interestingly, marital segregation, as reﬂected by π, and neighborhood segregation, as reﬂected
by q, are substitutes in terms of identity formation. In other words, the marginal eﬀect of marital
segregation on identity formation tends to be reduced the more segregated the neighborhood is (i.e.,
the larger is q).
In summary, under cultural distinction: (i) Identity is decreasing with neighborhood segregation
and increasing with minority homogamy; (ii) Marital segregation and neighborhood segregation are
substitutes for identity formation.
Consider now equation (20) characterizing the (endogenous) probability of homogamy as a function
of identity ν and neighborhood segregation q. The more intense is the identity formation, the higher
is the probability of homogamy. On the other hand, the eﬀect of q on π is ambiguous and reﬂects
two opposite eﬀects. First, there is a direct eﬀect related to the fact that the larger the proportion
of minority people in the neighborhood, the larger the probability of ﬁnding a minority spouse in
the common pool of potential partners. This eﬀect is reﬂected in the ﬁrst term q of (20). The
second eﬀect is illustrated by the second term (1 − q)
2 C(q)ν and indicates the impact of a change
in q on the marginal incentives to marital segregation (i.e., the socialization eﬀort τ). Indeed, the
more segregated is the neighborhood (i.e., the larger is q), the smaller are the incentives to spend
resources of ﬁnding directly a partner in the restricted pool of minority spouses. First, because social
interactions with the majority people are less costly, there is less of a need for identity formation that
can be eﬀectively expressed in an homogamous marriage. This is reﬂected by the term C(q). Second,
a larger proportion of minority people in the neighborhood also reduces the incentives to make special
eﬀort to ﬁnd a spouse in a segregated marital pool, as minority people are already more likely to be
found in the common marital pool. Both channels reduce therefore the incentives for socialization
eﬀorts τ, which, in turn, tends to reduce the probability of homogamy π.
It is also interesting to observe that, for the choice of socialization eﬀort and probability of ho-
mogamy, identity and neighborhood segregation (as reﬂected by q) are substitutes. More precisely,
the marginal eﬀect of identity on minority homogamy tends to be reduced the more segregated the
neighborhood (i.e., the larger is q).
This discussion can be summarized as follows: (i) The probability of marital segregation is increas-
ing in the intensity of identity while the eﬀect of neighborhood segregation is ambiguous, (ii) Identity
and neighborhood segregation are substitutes for homogamy.
Under cultural conformity, instead, the ﬁrst order conditions of the model are given by:
ν = πc q (21)
π = q +
c
α
q(1 − q)2ν (22)
18Again, simple conclusions can be drawn from these equations. Consider ﬁrst (21). In that case,
the larger the proportion q of minority members and the more segregated the neighborhood, the
higher C(q). Similarly, the larger the probability π of homogamous marriage, the larger the expected
beneﬁts from identity, and hence the more intense is identity formation. Again the sign of the cross
derivative is interesting. Marital segregation (as reﬂected by π) and neighborhood segregation (as
reﬂected by q), under cultural conformity, are complements in terms of identity formation. In other
words, the marginal eﬀect of marital segregation on identity formation is larger, the more segregated
the neighborhood is (i.e., the larger is q).
In summary, under cultural conformity: (i) Identity is increasing with neighborhood segregation
and increasing with minority homogamy; (ii) Marital segregation and neighborhood segregation are
complements for identity formation.
Consider now equation (22). The more intense is identity formation, the larger is the probability
of homogamy. The eﬀect of q on π is also ambiguous and reﬂects now three eﬀects. First, there is
as before the direct eﬀect related to the fact that the larger the proportion of minority people in the
neighborhood, the larger the probability of ﬁnding a minority spouse in the common pool of potential
partners. This eﬀect is illustrated by the ﬁrst term q in (22). A second positive eﬀect is illustrated
by νC(q) in the second term (1 − q)
2 νC(q).T h e l a r g e r q, the larger the conformity psychological
gain of social interactions with other minority individuals in the neighborhood and the associated
identity formation process that can be eﬀectively expressed in homogamous marriages. This increases
the incentives for homogamous marriages and the marginal incentives to marital segmentation (i.e.,
the socialization eﬀort τ).
T h el a s te ﬀect of q on π is negative. As in the case of cultural distinction, it reﬂects simply the fact
that a larger q reduces the incentives to make special eﬀorts to ﬁnd a spouse in a segregated marital
pool., as minority people are already likely to be found in the common marital pool. This channel,
captured by the expression (1 − q)
2 in the second term (1 − q)
2 νC(q) of equation (22), decreases the
incentives for socialization eﬀorts τ, and tends to reduce the probability of homogamy π.
Finally, identity and neighborhood segregation (as reﬂected by q) interact in terms of the formation








which is, in general, ambiguous. When C(0) = 0, namely when identity formation gains are very small







for small enough values of q. In that case, neighborhood segregation and identity are complements
for homogamy.
We conclude that: (i) The probability of marital segregation is increasing in the intensity of identity
while the eﬀect of neighborhood segregation is ambiguous; (ii) For small enough minority groups,
identity intensity and neighborhood segregation are complements for homogamy.
19From the ﬁrst order conditions of the cultural distinction and the cultural conformity models, it
clearly appears that the distinctive characteristics of the cultural distinction model are:
1. ν is decreasing in q, for q large; and
2. ∂2π
∂ν∂q < 0.
The reader might want to conclude that these are the characteristics of cultural distinction we are
identifying in the data.
4.6 Simulations
We now perform a series of simulations, using the estimates of our best model, the endogenous identity
model, to predict ethnic integration. We study the latter by looking at the relationship between the
identity or the homogamy status of an ethnic minority and his or her time spent in the UK.W ew i l l
also look at the role played by the neighborhood ethnic composition where this individual lives in
shaping such a process. We distinguish between ﬁrst and second generations of immigrants.31
Our analysis so far suggests that ethnic identities might be more intense in mixed rather than in
segregated neighborhoods. The additional questions that we seek to investigate regard the implications
of our structural estimates: (i) Do they imply that ethnic identity and homogamy decrease with
the time a person spends in the UK? And, is such a tendency more marked for second generation
immigrants? (ii) Do they imply that minorities living in more integrated (mixed) neighborhoods
show a stepper decreasing trend in the ethnic variables than those living in segregated neighborhoods?
And, is there any diﬀerence in the implied assimilation pattern between ﬁrst and second generation of
immigrants for a given neighborhood ethnic composition? We address such questions while controlling
for a variety of other individual and contextual characteristics, i.e., our simulations are run on the
model that includes our extensive set of controls.
We begin by showing the integration patterns of ethnic minorities over time. Figures 4a and 4b
show the predicted identity and homogamy values as a function of time spent in the UK for diﬀerent
generations. We can see that there is a tendency toward ethnic integration, which is particularly
pronounced for the second generation, in particular for identity.
[Insert Figures 4a and 4b here]
We then simulate those patterns when setting neighborhood composition equals to the sample
minimum, average and maximum levels. The results are reported in Figures 5a and 5b, for identity
and homogamy variables, respectively. Interestingly, the pictures remains largely unchanged for the
diﬀerent neighborhood ethnic compositions. It only appears a less steep decreasing trend of homogamy
in more segregated neighborhoods.
31“Time spent in the UK” is measured as “years since arrival”" for ﬁrst generation immigrants and as “age” for second
generation immigrants. Second generation immigrants are deﬁned as ethnic minority individuals who are born in the
UK.
20[Insert Figures 5a and 5b here]
Such ﬁndings thus show evidence of an integration patterns of immigrants, which is particularly
marked for second generation individuals and when ethnic identity is the ethnic dimension considered.
The residential neighborhood ethnic composition, however, does not seem to play a crucial role in
shaping such a pattern, neither for the ﬁrst nor for the second generation of immigrants.
Therefore, our analysis seems to suggest not only that ethnic identities might be more intense in
mixed rather than in segregated neighborhoods, but also that living in more mixed neighborhoods
does not ease the integration pattern.
5 Is Muslim identity diﬀerent?
A large debate has recently emerged in the popular press about the alleged speciﬁcity of Muslim
immigrants with regard to the strength of their identity and their (lack of) assimilation tendencies.32
Several of the ethnic groups for which we have data have in fact a signiﬁcant Muslim population;
notably Pakistani and Bangladeshi are predominantly Muslim, while Indians and African-Asian have
substantial Muslim minorities. Furthermore, the FNSEM survey contains a direct question asking
the respondent to identify his or her religious faith. In this section, we exploit therefore our data to
address directly the alleged Muslim speciﬁcity issue.
To this end, we repeat our analysis on the restricted sample of Muslim respondents (713 individuals,
roughly 45 percent of the whole sample). We maintain, however, the distribution by ethnic group as
the relevant neighborhood composition variable in the identity formation and socialization processes.
Descriptive statistics of our variables on this sub-sample can be found in the Data Appendix (Table
A1).
Our maximum likelihood results are contained in the last two columns of Table 3. They are
not qualitatively diﬀerent from those in the ﬁrst two columns, which are obtained on the whole
sample and discussed in the previous section. The endogenous identity with cultural distinction model
remains the mechanism that is more likely to represent the observed evidence. Indeed, a comparison
between the maximized likelihood values between the endogenous identity and the endogenous location
model clearly favors again the former one (-402.489 versus -446.066, respectively). The positive (and
statistically signiﬁcant) estimate of γ2 points to the fact that cultural distinction is the mechanism that
seems to ﬁt better our data. Such a ﬁnding indicates that the relationship between ethnic assimilation
eﬀort and ethnic neighborhood composition is not diﬀerent for Muslims than for other minorities. In
other words, we still ﬁnd evidence in line with the possibility that ethnic identity and socialization
32This position has been taken, in a rather extreme form, by several nationalist parties, e.g., the British National
Party in England, the Lega in Italy, the Front National in France, Sverige Demokraterna in Sweden. Similar though less
extreme positions have also been taken by center-right parties essentially all over Europe. A clear example of the inﬂamed
rhetoric that often accompanies this debate is Fallaci (2006). See also the discussion in Sheikh (2005) for Muslims in the
US and Bisin et al. (2008a) for Muslims in the UK.
21eﬀort are more intense in mixed rather than in segregated neighborhoods when only the Muslim
subsample is considered.
As for the whole sample, we now perform some simulations on the Muslims sub-sample of our best
model, the endogenous identity model, to predict ethnic integration, that is, identity and homogamy
as a function of “time spent in the UK”, and the role played by the neighborhood ethnic composition
in shaping such a process. The results are reported in Figures 6a and 6b, and 7a and 7b. Evidence of
slower integration for Muslims is apparent from these ﬁgures, in particular for ethnic identity. More
interestingly, although the second generation shows levels of identity and homogamy always lower
than the ﬁrst generation, we ﬁnd for second generation Muslims a tendency to increase rather than
decrease the strength of their ethnic identity and homogamy over time. The almost non-existent role
of neighborhood ethnic composition in shaping these patterns remain conﬁrmed in this sub-sample of
Muslims.
[Insert Figures 6a, 6b, 7a, and 7b here]
6 Discussion and policy implications
In this paper, we ﬁnd that: (i) in mixed neighborhoods, ethnic identity is much stronger than in
homogenous neighborhoods, suggesting cultural distinction among ethnic minorities in England; (ii)
there is a tendency toward ethnic integration, which is particularly pronounced for the second genera-
tion, in particular for ethnic identity; (iii) there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the integration patterns
in neighborhoods with diﬀerent ethnic compositions. Although Muslims, and in particular the second
generation, seem to be more reluctant to integrate, our ﬁndings (i)a n d ( iii) remain unchanged.
In light of these results, our analysis suggests that integration policies favoring the formation of
mixed neighborhoods, fearing the eﬀects of geographical segregation, are possibly minimally eﬀective if
not counterproductive. In this respect, our results could explain why the diﬀerent integration policies
implemented in the US and in Europe seem to have small eﬀects because of the possible perverse eﬀects
of integration policies which might trigger more intense ethnic identities. Indeed, mixing policies, which
include school busing, aﬃrmative action in public schools and in the workplace, forced integration of
public housing, and laws barring discrimination in housing and employment,33 have often had limited
eﬀects and are even being at times opposed by the same minority groups in whose interest they have
been pursued (see e.g., Jacoby, 1998, and Thernstrom and Thernstrom, 2002), consistently with the
view that identity formation mechanisms are driven by cultural distinction,
James Coleman, for instance, ﬁfteen years after the Coleman Report in 1966, which originally
proposed busing, admitted that, “the assumption that busing would improve achievement of lower-class
black children has now been shown to be ﬁction” (cited in Jacoby, 1999).34 Moving to Opportunity
(MTO) programs in the United States that relocate families from high- to low-poverty neighborhoods
33See Lang (2007) for an overview of these policies in the U.S.
34The failure of the busing and other civil right policies is certainly also due to the whites’ ﬂight from de-segregated
schools and neighborhoods.
22(and from racially segregated to mixed neighborhoods) also have had positive but arguably small eﬀects
(see, in particular, Ludwig, Duncan, and Hirschﬁeld, 2001, and Kling, Ludwig, and Katz, 2005).35
Similarly, the Toronto housing program where adults were assigned as children to diﬀerent residential
housing projects (Oreopoulos, 2003) did not give the expected results in terms of education outcomes.
In Europe diﬀerent integration policies and ambitious social programs have been implemented in urban
areas where immigrants live but they have had also limited results. This is the case, for instance, for the
creations of Zones of Educational Priority (ZEP) and for the rehabilitation of bleak housing projects
in immigrant neighborhoods under the guise of urban policy (‘politique de la ville’) in France.36
Finally, even racially integrated schools have recently lost much of their appeal in African-American
communities (see e.g., the ethnographic study of Gussin Paley, 1995).
Far from supporting policies to establish segregated neighborhoods, in this paper, we simply docu-
ment that the eﬀect of mixed neighborhood on identity formation and socialization might be perverse,
because of cultural distinction.
35There are, of course, other complementary mechanisms that could explain why the MTO programs had small eﬀects.
It is indeed possible that it is the loss of social networks that makes this policy relatively ineﬃcient. A recent book (De
Souza Briggs et al., 2010) evaluating the MTO programs shows that poor black families who move to richer areas tend
to mostly interact with their old friends (i.e. their old social networks) from their old “bad” neighborhoods. Based on
interviews and case studies, the authors claim that this may explain the relative small eﬀe c t so ft h i sp o l i c y . A n o t h e r
explanation for the relative failure of MTO programs given by Quigley and Raphael (2008) is that families move from
very poor to poor neighborhoods and thus the interactions in the new neighborhood is not that beneﬁcial. Using data on
adolescents in the US (AddHealth data), Weinberg (2010) show that individuals associate with people whose behaviors
and characteristics are similar to their own and this tendency is stronger in large groups. This suggests that the MTO
types of policies can have small eﬀects because the people who move to richer areas only interact with similar types of
people and not necessary with those who could generate positive externalities.
36See, for example, Benabou, Kramarz and Prost (2009) for an evaluation of the ZEP and Brubaker (2001) who
compares the diﬀerent ways of assimilating ethnic minorities in France, Germany, and the US.
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28APPENDIX
1. The marriage and identity model
Let us consider the model where both the strength of identity and the type of marriage are choice
variables. In the extended model, the ethnic minority minimizes his/her expected cost of interacting




−νπc(γ1 − γ2q)+c(γ1 − γ2q)+
1
2
ατ2 +( γτ xτ)τ +
1
2
ν2 +( γν xν)ν
¾
where the cost C(q)=cψ(q),w i t hψ(q)=γ1 − γ2q. In the cultural conformity model, γ1 =0and
γ2 = −1, while, in the cultural distinction model, γ1 = γ2 =1 . Solving this program leads to:
ν =[ c(γ1 − γ2q)]π − γν xν (23)
τ =
ν(1 − q)[c(γ1 − γ2q)] − γτ xτ
α
(24)
Now using the fact that τ =( π − q)/(1 − q) (from (2)), equation (24) can be written as:








Observe that (23) and (25) are equivalent to (9) and (10) for the extended model. We would like to
express ν and π as a function of q only. By combining these equations, we obtain:
ν∗ =
α[c(γ1 − γ2q)]q − (1 − q)[c(γ1 − γ2q)]γτ xτ − αγν xν
α − [c(γ1 − γ2q)]
2 (1 − q)2 (26)
π∗ =
αq − (1 − q)γτ xτ − [c(γ1 − γ2q)](1 − q)
2 γν xν
α − [c(γ1 − γ2q)]
2 (1 − q)2 (27)
We need therefore to identify γ1,γ2,c,α,γν and γτ. A simple informal argument for the identi-
ﬁcation of these parameters is as follows. For each ethnic minority, we observe q (the proportion of
ethnic minorities living in his/her neighborhood), xν (the individual’s characteristics links to the cost
of identity choice) and xτ (the individual’s characteristics links to the cost of the type of marriage
choice), the realization of I ∈ {0,1} (i.e. whether he/she has a strong identity or not), and the real-
ization of H ∈ {0,1} (i.e. whether he/she is married to someone from the same ethnic group). Since
Pr{I =1 } = ν and Pr{H =1 } = π,w ei d e n t i f yν with the fraction of individual with identity I =1
and π with the fraction of agents with homogamous marriage H =1 . The parameters γ1,γ2,c and
α are identiﬁed out of variations in q, from equations (26) and (27). Variations in xν and xτ identify
instead γν and γτ. This is even the case if a single vector x enters in the determination of ν and π,
that is, xν = xτ = x. For given q,c,α,γ1,γ2, in fact, in this case γν and γτ solve:
kν = −
αγν + c(γ1 − γ2q)(1− q)γτ
α − (1 − q)2c2 (γ1 − γ2q)
2
29kπ = −
c(γ1 − γ2q)(1− q)2γν +( 1− q)γτ
α − (1 − q)2c2 (γ1 − γ2q)
2
where kν and kπ are the estimated coeﬃcients of x in the equations (26) and (27) for ν and π,
respectively, for a given q. It is easy to check that one such solution exists.
2. The marriage and location model
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The ﬁrst order conditions of this individual’s problem are:
−νc[(1 − τ)(γ1 − γ2q) − πγ2] − γ2c + q + γq xq =0
−ν (1 − q)c(γ1 − γ2q)+ατ + γτ xτ =0
which, using τ =
π−q
1−q (from (2)), are equivalent to:





c(γ1 − γ2q) − q − γq xq =0







Writing this system of equations in terms of ν and q leads to:
ν =
α(π − q)+( 1− q)γτ xτ
(1 − q)
2 c(γ1 − γ2q)
and π is implicitly determined by the following equation
Aeπ2 + Beπ + De =0
where
Ae = −α(γ1 + γ2 − 2qγ2)
Be = α(γ1 − γ2q)(1+q)+αq(1 − q)γ2 − (1 − q)[γ1 − γ2q + γ2 (1 − q)]γτ xτ
De =( 1− q)(γ1 − γ2q)γτ xτ − αq(γ1 − γ2q) −
¡
q + γq xq − cγ2
¢
(1 − q)
3 (γ1 − γ2q)
As a result,
ν∗ =
α(π − q)+( 1− q)γτ xτ
(1 − q)









To identify γ1,γ2,c,α,γν and γτ, we can again use the same informal argument as we did above
for the marriage and identity model.
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Table A1: Description of data 




Variable  Explanation of the variable  Mean  St.dev.  Mean St.dev. 
          
Main variables          
Importance of religion  In the text  0.61  0.49  0.79  0.41 
Homogamy In  the  text  0.92  0.27  0.97  0.17 
Ward density of own ethnicity  In the text  13.60  10.76  15.04 11.23 
          
Individual controls          
Age at arrival  Respondent's age in years at arrival in the UK  21.15  10.38  20.49 9.63 
Age  Respondent's age in years  41.37  13.09  39.44 12.84 
Female  Dummy variable taking value one if the 
respondent is female. 
0.47 0.50  0.46 0.50 
Born in the UK  Dummy variable taking value one if the 
respondent is born in the UK 
0.10 0.30  0.06 0.26 
Arranged Marriage  Dummy variable taking value one if the 
husband/wife of the respondent has been 
chosen by the parents.
0.37 0.48  0.53 0.50 
Discrimination  Dummy variable taking value one if the 
respondent had been  insulted or threatened in 
the last year for reasons to do with race or 
colour. 
0.10 0.30  0.09 0.28 
Children  Dummy variable taking value one if the 
respondent has children.
0.91 0.28  0.93 0.25 
Years since arrival  Number of years since respondent's arrival in 
the UK. 
20.22 11.42  18.96 10.63 
British degree  Dummy variable taking value one if the 
respondent has a UK degree. 
0.21 0.41  0.09 0.28 
British high education  Dummy variable taking value one if the 
respondent has a UK O-level (or equivalent) or 
above qualification. 
0.16 0.37  0.08 0.26 
Foreign education  Dummy variable taking value one if the 
respondent has a qualification achieved 
abroad. 
0.28 0.45  0.26 0.44 
Employed  Dummy variable taking value one if the 
respondent is employed. 
0.47 0.50  0.29 0.45 
Manager  Dummy variable taking value one if the 
respondent is a manager. 
0.03 0.16  0.01 0.12 
Employee  Dummy variable taking value one if the 
respondent is an employee 
0.57 0.50  0.42 0.49 
House owner  Dummy variable taking value one if the 
household owns (or is buying) the 
accommodation 
0.76 0.43  0.67 0.47 
          
Contextual controls          
English spoken at home   Dummy variable taking value one if English is 
the language normally spoken  at home with 
family members (who are older) by the 
respondent. 
0.12 0.33  0.07 0.25 
English spoken with friends  Dummy variable taking value one if English is 
the language normally spoken with friends 
(outside work) by the respondent. 
0.51 0.50  0.45 0.50 
English spoken at work  Dummy variable taking value one if English is 
the language normally spoken at work by the 
respondent. 
0.48 0.50  0.39 0.49 
Ward density of all ethnic groups  Percentage of residents of any ethnic group in 
the ward 
33.63 21.01  38.66 20.27 
Ward unemployment rate  Ward unemployment rate  14.38  5.24  16.60 4.51 
 Figure 1: Ethnic composition by neighborhood class 
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 Figure 4a Predicted Identity as a function of time spent in the UK 
 
Notes to Figures 4a to 5b. Endogenous identity model, second generation immigrants in 
the sample are older than 10 years 
 
Figure 4b Predicted Homogamy as a function of time spent in the UK 
 Figure 5a Predicted Identity as a function of time spent in the UK – i) at minimum q, ii) at 
average q, iii) at maximal q 
i)   
ii)   
iii)   
 Figure 5b Predicted Homogamy as a function of time spent in the UK – i) at minimum q, ii) at 
average q, iii) at maximal q 
i)   
ii)   
iii)   
 Figure 6a Predicted Identity as a function of time spent in the UK- Muslim sample- 
 
Notes to Figures 6a to 7b. Endogenous identity model, second generation immigrants in 
the muslim sub- sample are older than 10 years and younger than 40 years 
 
Figure 6b Predicted Homogamy as a function of time spent in the UK- Muslim sample- 
 Figure 7a Predicted Identity as a function of time spent in the UK – i) at minimum q, ii) at 
average q, iii) at maximal q –Muslim sample 
i)   
ii)   
iii)   
 Figure 7b Predicted Homogamy as a function of time spent in the UK – i) at minimum q, ii) at 
average q, iii) at maximal q- Muslim sample 
i)   
ii)   
iii)   
 Table 1: Ethnic Identity, Homogamy and Ethnic Neighborhood Composition 
 
  (1): Dep. Var.: Ethnic identity measured by importance of religion 
(2): Dep. Var.: Homogamy 
  (1) (2) (1)  (2) (1) (2) 
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Contextual controls          












Ward density of all ethnic 


















-1115.9003  Likelihood 
Notes. Bivariate probit model estimation results. Marginal effects and robust standard errors in parentheses are 
reported. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table 2: Ethnic Identity, Homogamy and Ethnic Neighborhood Composition 
 
  (1): Dep. Var.: Ethnic identity measured by ethnic group identification 
(2): Dep. Var.: Homogamy 
  (1) (2) (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
























    
  (1): Dep. Var.: Ethnic identity measured by school ethnic composition 
(2): Dep. Var.: Homogamy 
  (1) (2) (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
























          
  (1): Dep. Var.: Ethnic identity measured by inter-ethnic marriage 
(2): Dep. Var.: Homogamy 
  (1) (2) (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
























          
          
Control set for all specifications        
          
Individual  controls  no no yes yes yes yes 
Contextual controls  no  no  no  no  yes  yes 
          
Notes. Bivariate probit model estimation results. Marginal effects and robust standard errors in parentheses are reported. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 Table 3: Maximum likelihood results  
-Structural approach- 
 


















   










































Control set        
Individual variables  yes yes yes yes 
Contextual variables  yes  yes  yes  yes 
        
Likelihood value  -1288.972 -1369.097 -402.489 -446.066 
       
 